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"LIFE IS IN MIRRORS, DEATH DISAPPEARS":
GIVING LIFE TO ATKINS
MICHAEL L. PERLIN*
INTRODUCTION
Anyone who has spent any time in the criminal justice system-as a defense
lawyer, as a district attorney, or as a judge-knows that our treatment of criminal
defendants with mental disabilities has been, forever, a scandal. Such defendants
receive substandard counsel,' are treated poorly in prison,2 receive disparately longer
sentences, 3 and are regularly coerced into confessing to crimes (many of which they
did not commit). 4 And those of us who know about this system know that it is a
scandal of little interest to most lawyers, most citizens, and most judges. We further
know that the one question on which we obsessively focus-the scope and role of
the insanity defense-is virtually irrelevant to this entire conversation.'
This is not news and has not been so for decades.6 We are content to "bury our
heads in the sand" and ignore the ramifications of the morally corrupt system that
we have created. But every once in a while, a case is decided that makes us
reconsider this question and forces us to see what we do on a regular basis in that
system. Atkins v. Virginia8 is such a case.
My thesis is simple: In spite of the impressive victory earned in Atkins by
advocates for persons with mental disabilities, that victory may be illusory unless
we look carefully at a constellation of legal, social, and behavioral issues that have
combined to poison this area of the law for decades. Atkins gives us a blueprint with
which to work, but we must remain vigilant to make sure that it does not become
merely a "paper victory." 9 This article will raise seventeen issues that must be

* Professor of Law, New York Law School. A.B., Rutgers University, 1966; J.D., Columbia University
School of Law, 1969. The author wishes to thank the participants-both faculty and students-in the New York
Law School Faculty Scholarship Lunch Seminar series for their extraordinarily helpful comments, and to single out
Steve Ellmann for his encouragement, suggestions, support and assistance. He also wishes to thank Jeanie Bliss for
her superlative research help.
1. See, e.g., David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 2 (1973)
(referring to such lawyers as "walking violations of the Sixth Amendment").

2. See, e.g., Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1320 (E.D. Cal. 1995). See generallyNational Alliance
for the Mentally Ill, Where We Stand, Criminalization of People with Mental Illness, available at
http://www.nami.org/update/unitedcriminal.html (last visited May 13, 2003).
3. See, e.g., Thomas Hafemeister & John Petrila, Treating the Mentally DisorderedOffender: Society's
Uncertain, Conflicted, and Changing Views, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 729, 754 n.91 (1994) (citing cases).
4. This path is traced explicitly in Justice Brennan's dissent in Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 178
n.2 (1986). On false confessions in this context, see generally C.K. Sigelman et al., When in Doubt Say Yes:
Acquiescence in Interview with Mentally Retarded Persons, 19 MENTAL RETARDATION 53, 53-58 (1981).
5. See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 37-49 (1994).
6. See generally 4 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, chs. 8-12 (2d ed.
2002) [hereinafter PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW]; PERLIN, supra note 5, at 37-49 (discussing obsessive focus

on role of insanity defense).
7. See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL (2000).

8. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
9. This concept is discussed in the mental disability litigation context in, inter alia, Michael L. Perlin,

"Their Promises of Paradise": Will Olmstead v. L.C. Resuscitatethe Constitutional"Least Restrictive Alternative"
Principle in Mental Disability Law?, 37 HOUSTON L. REV. 999, 1049 (2000). See generally Michael S. Lottman,
Paper Victories and Hard Realities, in PAPER VICTORIES AND HARD REALITIES: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OFTHE MENTALLY DISABLED 93 (Valerie Bradley & Gary Clarke eds., 1976).
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considered rigorously and carefully if Atkins is to make any sense and if it is to have
any true meaning for the population that is its focal point.
The article will proceed in this manner. First, it will briefly look at some earlier
signposts on this road-the Ford v. Wainwright"' decision, then Penry v. Lynaugh"
(with a brief nod at Penry v. Johnson 2)-andwill try to uncover which meta-issues
were really animating the majority and dissenting Justices in those opinions. 3 Next,
the article will briefly summarize the key points of Atkins (from the perspective of
this article) 4 and then will consider what will be characterized as the seventeen
"pressure points" in Atkins, pressure points that must be taken extraordinarily
seriously if the Atkins decision is, in fact, to be given life (pun clearly intended). 5
Finally, the article will offer some brief conclusions-both prescriptions and
proscriptions-focusing primarily on what the likely meaning of the Atkins decision
will be for the advocacy community. 6
I am a Bob Dylan fan, and have been drawing on Dylan lyrics in my article titles
for the past seven years.' 7 When I last wrote about the death penalty-in a piece that
looked both at the way jurors "convert" evidence offered in support of mitigation
into evidence in support of aggravation, and at the abysmal job that defense counsel
often does in death penalty cases-I drew on a line from Dylan's well-known
masterpiece, A HardRain's A-Gonna Fall:" "the executioner's face is always well
hidden."' 9 For the title of this article, I draw on a somewhat-more obscure song, one
that I have unfortunately never seen in person,2" Political World, from Dylan's
painfully-underrated 1989 album, Oh Mercy.2 The song has been called by a critic
"Bob's commentary on the state of the fallen world we live in,"22 and I think that is
about right. The lyric that I have chosen, "Life is in mirrors; death disappears," is,
I think, about as on point for this article as I could find anywhere. This is the couplet
from which it comes:
We live in a political world
Where mercy walks the plank,
10. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
I1.492 U.S. 302 (1989).
12. 532 U.S. 782 (2001).
13. See infra part I.
14. See infra part 11.
15. See infra part II.
16. See infra part IV.
17. I began down this path with Michael L. Perlin, "Dignity Was the First to Leave": Godinez v. Moran,
Colin Ferguson, and the Trial of Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendants, 14 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 61 (1996)
[hereinafter Perlin, Dignity]. My most recent effort is Michael L. Perlin, "What's GoodIs Bad, What's Badls Good,
You'll Find Out When You Reach the Top, You're on the Bottom": Are the Americans with DisabilitiesAct (and
Olmstead v. L.C.) Anything More than "Idiot Wind?", 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 235 (2001-02) [hereinafter Perlin,
Idiot Wind].
18. BOB DYLAN, LYRICS, 1962-1985 (1985) 59.
19. Michael L. Perlin, "The Executioner's Face Is Always Well-Hidden": The Role of Counsel and the
Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 201 (1996).
20. He hasn't played it in ten years, but, knowing Bob, it may reappear miraculously one of these days. See
How Long Has It Been Since DylanPlayed..., at http://www.geocities.com/adam I 117/boblast.html#OH (last visited
May 5, 2003).
21.

BOB DYLAN, OH MERCY (Sony Records 1989).

22. Ring Them Bells Ye Heathen, A Review of "Oh Mercy," at http://www.therebelbase.homestead.com/
ohmercy.html (last visited May 14, 2003).
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Life is in mirrors, death disappears
23
Up the steps into the nearest bank.
Interestingly, the following lyrics surround this couplet:
We live in a political world,
Wisdom is thrown into jail,
It rots in a cell, is misguided as hell
Leaving no one to pick up a trail.

We live in a political world
Where courage is a thing of the past
Houses are haunted, children are unwanted
The next day could be your last.24
"Rots in a cell"; "the next day could be your last"; I could not get much closer
than this. And, of course, the "nearest bank" line pays homage to the issue focused
on in the Executioner'sFace article: the criminally-inadequate fee schedules in capital cases are often a contributing reason-perhaps the most important factor-involved in the calculus of who will live and who will die. Yet my daughter Julie (a
twenty-three-year-old recent college graduate and a serious Dylan fan in her own
right) came up with an additional/alternative connection to the "mirrors" line. People
see themselves in mirrors, she said, and are blinded to others. People with mental
retardation remain invisible to us in many ways, especially after they are imprisoned.2 6 1 think Julie is on to something, and her insight needs to be added to any interpretation of the lyric in question. I note, also, that my most recent book is titled The
27
HIDDEN Prejudice:Mental Disabilityon Trial and deals with the invisibility of the
prejudice against persons with mental disability, an invisibility that is a manifestation of what I call sanism. 21 One cannot read Atkins without thinking about sanism.

23. Lyrics available at http://bobdylan.com/songs/political.html (last visited May 14, 2003).
24. Id.
25. See Perlin, supra note 19, at 205:
And one often gets what one pays for. Professor Robert Weisberg, an appellate defense counsel

in death cases, has mordantly noted: "The fees [at trial] were infamously low. The second capital
appeal I worked on was a case where the defense lawyer was paid $150 for the entire case, and,

believe me, he earned every penny of it." (Footnote omitted).
26. See Michael L. Perlin et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Rights ofInstitutionalized Mentally
Disabled Persons: Hopeless Oxymoron or Path to Redemption? I PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 80, 87 (1995) ("They

are the people society renders the most visible within the community, and they are virtually invisible when expelled
from the community.").
27. PERLIN, supra note 7 (emphasis added).
28. See, e.g., Perlin, Idiot Wind, supra note 17, at 236:
"Sanism" is defined as an irrational prejudice towards mentally ill persons, which is of the same

quality and character as other irrational prejudices. Such other prejudices are reflected in
prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnicity. As I recently wrote:
Sanism is as insidious as other "isms" and is, in some ways, more troubling, because it is (a)
largely invisible, (b) largely socially acceptable, and (c) frequently practiced (consciously and
unconsciously) by individuals who regularly take "liberal" or "progressive" positions decrying

similar biases and prejudices that involve sex, race, ethnicity, or sexual orientation. It is a form
of bigotry that "responsible people can express in public." Like other "isms," sanism is based
largely upon stereotype, myth, superstition and deindividualization....
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I. THE ROAD FROM FORD TO PENRYTO ATKINS
29
A. The FordDecision
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area of the law is tortured, and there
is no easy way to reduce it to a coherent example of doctrinal growth and
development. 3 The modem era begins with its decision in Ford v. Wainwright,31 in
which a fractured Court concluded that the Eighth Amendment did prohibit the
imposition of the death penalty on an insane prisoner.
Justice Marshall-writing in the only portion of any of the four opinions that
captured a majority of the court-pointed out that since the Court decided Solesbee
v. Balkcom 33 in 1950, its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence had "evolved
substantially., 34 Its ban on "cruel and unusual punishment embraced, at a minimum,
those modes or acts of punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at the
time that the Bill of Rights was adopted"35 and also recognized the "evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society., 36 In coming to
its determination, the Court took into account "objective evidence of contemporary
values before determining whether a particular punishment comports with the
fundamental human dignity that the Amendment protects. '"s7
The opinion traced the common law development of the doctrine barring
execution of the insane, 38 noting that, while the reasons for the rule were not
precisely clear, 39 "it is plain the law is so." 4 ° It concluded that there was "virtually
no authority condoning the execution of the insane at42English common law,"'" and
that "this solid proscription was carried to America.,

The practicing bar, courts, legislatures, professional psychiatric and psychological
associations, and the scholarly academy are all largely silent about sanism. A handful of
practitioners, lawmakers, scholars and judges have raised lonely voices, but the topic is simply
"off the agenda" for most of these groups.
See also Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism", 46 SMU L. REV. 373, 374-76 (1992); PERLIN, supra note 7, at 22-23.
29. This section is generally adapted from 4 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 6 § 12-4.1c, at
527-38.
30. See generally Michael L. Perlin, The Supreme Court, the Mentally Disabled Criminal, and Symbolic
Values: Random Decisions, Hidden Rationales, or "Doctrinal Abyss"?, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1987).
31. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
32. Id. at 405-10.
33. 339 U.S. 9 (1950).
34. Ford, 477 U.S. at 405.
35. Id. at 405-06 (citing, inter alia, Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285-86 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
36. Id. at 406 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
37. Id. (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
38. Id. at 406-07.
39. Id. See also 4 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 6 § 12-4.1 a, at 520-22.
40. Ford, 477 U.S. at 408 (quoting Hawles, Remarks on the Trial of Mr. Charles Bateman, II How. ST. TR.
474, 477 (1685)).
41.

Id.

42. Id. "(lIt was early observed that 'the judge is bound' to stay the execution upon insanity of the prisoner."
(citing I CHIrrY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW *761 (5th Am. ed. 1847), and I WHARTON, A
TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW § 59 (8th ed. 1880)).
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This "ancestral legacy" has not "outlived its time," the Court added.43 No state
currently permits execution of the insane," and it is "clear that the ancient and
humane limitation upon the State's ability to execute its sentences has as firm a hold
upon the jurisprudence of today as it had centuries ago in England":4 5
The various reasons put forth in support of the common-law restriction have no
less logical, moral, and practical force than they did when first voiced. For
today, no less than before, we may seriously question the retributive value of
executing a person who has no comprehension of why he has been singled out
and stripped of his fundamental right to life. See Note, The Eighth Amendment
and the Execution of the Presently Incompetent, 32 Stan. L. Rev. 765, 777 n.58
(1980). Similarly, the natural abhorrence civilized societies feel at killing one
who has no capacity to come to grips with his own conscience or deity is still
vivid today. And the intuition that such an execution simply offends humanity
is evidently shared across the Nation. Faced with such wide-spread evidence of
a restriction upon sovereign power, this Court is compelled to conclude that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from carrying out a sentence of death upon
a prisoner who is insane. Whether its aim be to protect the condemned from fear
and pain without comfort or understanding, or to protect the dignity of society
itself from the barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance, the restriction finds
enforcement in the Eighth Amendment.46
Justice Powell concurred, joining fully in the majority's opinion on the
substantive Eighth Amendment issue 47 but writing separately, at least in part, to
consider an issue not addressed by the Court: the meaning of "insanity" in the
48
context of the case before it.
After considering the common law justifications for
barring execution of the insane, Justice Powell concluded that the Eighth
Amendment should only bar the execution of those "who are unaware of the
punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it,"' 49 a category into
which Ford "plainly fit."5 Also, Powell argued, because the defendant "has been
validly convicted of a capital crime and sentenced to death," the question is not
"whether, but when, his execution may take place."'51 Thus making inapplicable
earlier Court decisions imposing heightened procedural requirements on capital
trials and sentencing proceedings.5 2

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

id.at 408.
Id. at 408-09 n.2 (listing statutes).
Id. at 409.
Id. at 409-10.
Id. at 418 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. See Mezer & Rheingold, Mental Capacity and Incompetency: A PsychologicalProblem, 119 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 827, 828 (1962) (identifying varying competency standards governing eleven separate areas of the
law). See generally 3 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 6 § 7A-4. 1.
49. Ford, 477 U.S. at 422.
50. Id. Compare Rector v. Bryant, 501 U.S. 1239, 1239 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (criticizing court's decision to deny certiorari in case presenting question of whether a prisoner whose
mental incapacity renders him unable to recognize or communicate facts that would make his sentence unlawful
or unjust is nonetheless competent to be executed). For further proceedings, see Rector v. Clinton, 308 Ark. 104,
823 S.W.2d 829 (1992).
51. Ford, 477 U.S. at 425.
52. Id. at n.5 (noting that "some defendants may lose their mental facilities and never regain them, and thus
avoid execution altogether").
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Writing for herself and Justice White, Justice O'Connor concurred in part and
dissented in part. Due process demands in this sort of case are "minimal, '5 3 she
concluded, noting "substantial caution" was warranted "before reading the Due
Process Clause to mandate anything like the full panoply of trial-type procedures. 54
This was so for several reasons: (1) after a valid conviction, the demands of due
process are "reduced accordingly"; 55 (2) the potential for false claims and deliberate
delay in this context is "obviously enormous";56 and (3) by definition, the
defendant's protected interest can "never be conclusively and finally determined...
until the very moment of execution."57
Finally, Justice Rehnquist dissented on behalf of himself and the Chief Justice. 58
He saw no reason to abandon Solesbee, which had sanctioned procedures vesting
decision making in "the solemn responsibility of a state's highest executive with
authority to invoke the aid of the most skillful class of experts on the crucial
questions involved."59 He concluded that state law did not grant the defendant the
sort of entitlement "that gives rise to the procedural protections for which he
contends. '60 To create a constitutional right to a judicial determination of sanity
prior to execution "needlessly complicates and postpones still further any finality
in this area of the law,' in an area where yet another adjudication "offers an
invitation to those who have62 nothing to lose by accepting it to advance entirely
spurious claims of insanity.1

B. The Meaning of Ford
Ford was both a curious and difficult opinion,63 and one that reflected much of
the ambiguity and ambivalence that continues to permeate this subject matter. To
some extent, Ford serves as a paradigm for the Supreme Court's confusion and, to
some extent, its use of rationalization as a means of dealing with many of the cases
it has decided in the past several decades dealing with mentally disabled criminal
defendants.'

53. Id. at 427 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). On those aspects of the majority
opinion in Ford dealing with procedural issues, see 4 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 6 § 12-4. 1c,
at 531-34.
54. Ford,477 U.S. at 429.
55. Id. (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976)).
56. Id. at 429 (citing Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398, 405-06 (1897)). Cf Joseph Rodriguez et al., The
Insanity Defense Under Siege: Legislative Assaults and Legal Rejoinders, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 397, 404 (1983) (no
question as to presence of serious mental illness in 138 of 141 successful insanity defense cases studied).
57. Ford, 477 U.S. at 429.
58. Id. at 431 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 432.
60. Id.
at 433.
61. Id. at434.
62. Id. at 435:
A claim of insanity may be made at any time before sentence, and, once rejected, may be used
again; a prisoner found sane two days before execution might claim to have lost his sanity the
next day thus necessitating another judicial determination of his sanity and presumably another
stay of execution.
63. See 4 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 6 § 12-4.Id, at 539-42.
64. See generally PERLIN, supra note 7, at 78-98.
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There are significant inconsistencies between the positions articulated in the
various Ford opinions and positions with which the Court had appeared to be
entirely comfortable in the past. Justice Powell's position that the only question is
not "whether but when"65 ignored the possibility that organic brain damage, for
instance, could make a once competent-to-be-executed defendant become
irreversiblyincompetent, or that, in a state that has abolished the insanity defense,
it is not beyond the realm of possibility that a defendant like the petitioner in
Jackson v. Indiana66 might face execution. 67 And both Justice Rehnquist's and
Justice O'Connor's opinions remained obsessed with the fear that defendants will
raise "false ' 68 or "spurious claims" 69 in desperate attempts to stave off execution.
This fear-a doppelgangerof the public's "swift and vociferous... outrage"70 over
what it perceives as "abusive"'" insanity acquittals, thus allowing "guilty"
defendants to "beat the rap" 7"-was responded to more than adequately almost 150
years ago by Dr. Isaac Ray, the father of American forensic psychiatry:
The supposed insurmountable difficulty of distinguishing between feigned and
real insanity has conduced, probably more than all other causes together, to bind
the legal profession to the most rigid construction and application of the
common law relative to this disease, and is always put forward in objection to
the more humane doctrines.73
C. Following Ford
Subsequent to Ford,courts have split in their assessment of whether individual
defendants were competent to be executed under the standards set out in that case.74
As with other important areas of criminal procedure, the question of whether a
defendant was "malingering" remains an important question in this context. 75 Other

65. Ford,477 U.S. at 425 (Powell, J., concurring). See 4 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 6
§ 12-4.1c.
66. 406 U.S. 715, 726 (1972) ("There is nothing in the record that even points to any possibility that
Jackson's present condition can be remedied at any future time."). See generally 4 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY
LAW, supra note 6 § 8A-5.2.
67. See, e.g., People ex rel. Myers v. Briggs, 46111.2d 281, 263 N.E.2d 109 (1970) (indicting defendant for
murder in case "virtually indistinguishable" from the clinical and procedural facts of Jackson).
68. Ford, 477 U.S. at 429 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
69. Id. at 435 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
70. See INGO KEILITZ & JUNIUS FULTON, THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND ITS ALTERNATIVES: A GUIDE FOR
POLICYMAKERS (1984).

71. See Michael L. Perlin, "The Things We Do for Love": John Hinckley's Trial and the Future of the
Insanity Defense in the Federal Courts, 30 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 857, 859 (1985) (Book Review of LINCOLN
CAPLAN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR. (1984)).

72. Id. at 860. See also DAVID M. NISSMAN ET AL., BEATING THE INSANITY DEFENSE: DENYING THE LICENSE
TO KILL (1980).
73. ISAAC RAY, A TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY § 247, at 243 (Winfred
Overholser ed., 1962 ed.).
74. See 4 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 6 § 12-4. le, at 542-43 n.457 (citing cases).
75. See Boggs v. State, 667 So. 2d 765, 766 n.3 (Fla. 1996) (discussing press report of trial judge's beliefs
that defendant was "faking mental illness to avoid execution"). On the significance of this position to Justice
Scalia's opinion in Atkins, see infra notes 150-151. See generally, on this question, Michael L. Perlin, "The
Borderline Which SeparatedYou from Me": The Insanity Defense, the AuthoritarianSpirit,the Fearof Faking, and
the Culture of Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1375 (1997).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

cases decided on related questions reveal a continued failure on the part of many
courts to authentically implement the Forddecision.76
D. The Penry I Decision
While Ford v. Wainwright clarified the question of the constitutionality of
executing persons with mental illness,7 8 it did not answer the collateral and equally
important issue of the constitutionality of executing individuals who have mental
retardation. In Penry v. Lynaugh,79 the Supreme Court approached the question from
a significantly different perspective and reached a strikingly different conclusion.8'
Penry was moderately mentally retarded (with an I.Q. of 50 to 63, the mental age
of a six-and-a-half-year-old, and the social maturity of a nine-to-ten-year-old). 8' In
addressing the question of whether the Constitution banned the execution of persons
with mental retardation, the Supreme Court turned to the Eighth Amendment issue.
While the Court conceded that it might be cruel and unusual punishment to execute
those who are "profoundly or severely retarded and wholly lacking the capacity to
appreciate the wrongfulness of their actions," 82 it suggested that, because of "the
protections afforded by the insanity defense today," such persons were not likely
either to be convicted or to face punishment. 83 Further, it distinguished the case
before it on factual grounds: Penry had been found competent to stand trial, and the
jury had rejected his insanity defense, reflecting their conclusion that he did know
right from wrong at the time of the offense.'I It further dismissed Penry' s argument
that there was an "emerging national consensus" against execution of persons with

76. See 4 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 6 § 12.4.1e, at 544:

Ford.. reflects the depth of the split on the question of the standards to be employed in
determining one's competency to be executed. Further, the perplexing inconsistencies between
the positions taken by several of the Justices and their opinions in other mental disability cases
probably result from the grave difficulties the Justices face in resolving these questions.
Unfortunately, the fact that the procedural aspect of Ford is "controlled" by a plurality opinion
will make it far more difficult for legislators in those states with statutes similar to Florida's to
draft new laws that are constitutionally sound.
See, e.g., Cuevas v. Collins, 932 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th Cir. 1991) (hearing not required unless defendant is "so
deranged that he is unaware that he is about to be put to death"); Garrett v. Collins, 951 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1992)
(holding that defendant's belief that his dead aunt would protect him from effects of toxic agents used during
execution did not preclude imposition of death penalty on grounds of incompetency); Shaw v. Delo, 762 F. Supp.
853 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (holding that funds for investigative and expert services to support incompetency claim were
not necessary). On the question of whether a trial court can exclude the death penalty as a possible punishment
because of a defendant's mental illness, see Commonwealth v. Ryan, 5 S.W.3d 113 (Ky. 1999) (finding that court
lacked authority to do so).
77. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
78. See 4 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 6 §§ 12-4.1 c-I 2-4. Id, at 527-42.
79. 492 U.S. 302 (1989). For the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Penry,see Penry v.Johnson, 532
U.S. 782 (2001), discussed in 4 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 6 §§ 10-2.3e, 12-3.3. In the latter
decision, the Supreme Court again remanded because of errors in the trial court's charge on the issue of mitigation.
See Penry, 532 U.S. at 797-801.
80. For representative pre-Penrycases dealing with this population, see, e.g., Bell v. Lynaugh, 858 F.2d 978
(5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925 (1989) (mentally retarded individuals subject to death penalty); State v.
Jones, 298 S.C. 118, 378 S.E.2d 594 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1060 (1990) (same outcome); Brogdon v. Butler,
824 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1987) (same outcome).
81. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. at 307-08.
82. Id. at 333.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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retardation, noting that only one state had legislatively banned such executions and
rejecting Penry's evidence on this point of public opinion surveys as an "insufficient
basis" upon which to ground an Eighth Amendment prohibition.
On the question of whether such punishment was disproportionate, Justice
O'Connor86 rejected Penry's argument that individuals with mental retardation do
not have the same degree of culpability, as they do not have the same "judgment,
perspective and control as persons of normal intelligence." 87 On the record before
the Court, she could not conclude that all mentally retarded persons-"by virtue of
their mental retardation alone, and apart from any individualized consideration of
their personal responsibility-invariably lack the cognitive, volitional, and moral
88
capacity to act with the degree of culpability associated with the death penalty.
Further, she rejected the concept that there was a baseline "mental age" beneath
which one could not be executed, arguing that this sort of a bright line test might
have a "disempowering effect" on the mentally retarded if applied in other areas of
the law (such as contracts or domestic relations). 89 Thus, she concluded that, while
mental retardation might "lessen" a defendant's culpability, the Eighth Amendment
did not preclude the execution of any mentally retarded person. 90
In partial dissent, 9' Justice Brennan (for himself and for Justice Marshall) 92 stated
that he would ban capital punishment in the case of any mentally retarded offender
who "thus lack[ed] the full degree of responsibility for [his] crimes that is a
predicate for the constitutional imposition of the death penalty., 93 First, on the
question of proportionality, while Justice Brennan agreed that the treatment of
persons with mental retardation as a homogeneous group is inappropriate for many
reasons, he argued that the dangers associated with that sort of overgeneralization
disappear in the context of the controlling clinical definition for the purposes of
punishment. Quoting from documents prepared by the American Association of
Mental Retardation, he reasoned that all mentally retarded individuals share the
common attributes of "low intelligence and inadequacies of adaptive behavior" as
well as "reduced ability" in such areas of functioning as "ability to control
impulsivity [and] moral development." 94 Such impairment so limits the individual's
culpability so as to make capital punishment "always and necessarily disproportionate to.. .blameworthiness and hence.. .unconstitutional. 95
85. Id. at 334. See generally V. Stephen Cohen, Exempting the Mentally Retardedfrom the Death Penalty:
A Comment on Florida's Proposed Legislation, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 457 (1991).

86. No other member of the court joined in this aspect of Justice O'Connor's opinion. The remainder of the
opinion reflected a majority.
87. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. at 336.
88. Id. at 338-39.
89. Id. at 338-40. This assertion of Justice O'Connor has been used to buttress a decision upholding the
admissibility of a confession of a person with mental retardation (see generally 4 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW,
supra note 6 §§ 10-3-10-3.3d). See United States v. Macklin, 900 F.2d 948, 952-53 (6th Cir. 1990).
90. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. at 340.
91. Id. at 341. Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in those aspects of the majority's opinion that dealt with
the question of mitigation.
92. Id. at 349. Justice Stevens also partially dissented (for himself and Justice Blackmun), concluding that
executions of the mentally retarded are unconstitutional.
93. Id. at 341 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
94. Id. at 346.
95. Id. at 346-48. Even if mental retardation were not always associated with the requisite lack of culpability,
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Second, Justice Brennan found that the execution of an individual with mental
retardation neither furthers the punishment aims of deterrence nor of retribution.
Because such individuals lack the requisite culpability, execution can never be a
"just desert" for a retarded offender.96 Similarly, the factors that make capital
punishment disproportionate when applied to persons with mental retardation give
the penalty "the most minimal deterrent effect" as far as retarded potential offenders
are concerned; the potential death penalty will not, for such individuals, "figure in
some careful assessment of different courses of action."97
In a separate opinion, Justice Scalia (writing for himself, Justice White, Justice
Kennedy, and the Chief Justice) parted company with those aspects of Justice
O'Connor's opinions that dealt with proportionality, arguing that the concerns she
expressed "ha[ve] no place in our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence."98
In an early analysis of this aspect of Penry, a student commentator characterized
it as a "troubling decline in the Court's death penalty jurisprudence,"9 9 concluding
that its Eighth Amendment analyses relied upon "overly narrow considerations...
[while] ignor[ing] the broader social and political context in which public sentiment
and defendant culpability must be evaluated."'' 0 The author focused on those aspects
of the opinion that relied on legislative silence as indicia that public opinion did not
oppose such executions:
Even if one assumes that legislation reflects the collective will, the absence of
legislation may only reflect a failure to secure a place on the legislative agenda.
A strong consensus may never be articulated through legislation if the issue
never comes to a vote. Therefore, in construing legislative silence, the Court
should pay special heed to the political enactment and hesitate to draw
substantive conclusions from the products of process failure. Because mentally
retarded citizens have difficulty participating in the political process, the Court's
assumption that legislative silence signified more than public misunderstanding
and political inattention was unreasonable."'
Beyond this, two other curious aspects of Penry deserve mention. First, Justice
O'Connor's bald assertion that the insanity defense serves as a bulwark to protect
against the conviction and punishment of persons with severe mental disabilities
stands in stark opposition to the track record of counsel in the representation of such

Justice Brennan argued that he would still find capital punishment unconstitutional for such individuals, since there
is no assurance that an adequate individualized assessment of whether the death penalty is a proportionate
punishment will be made at the conclusion of each death penalty trial as the relationship between degree of
culpability and status of mental retardation is not "isolated" as a factor that "determinatively bars a death sentence."
Id.
96. Id. at 348 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)).
97. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. at 348-49.
98. Id. at 350-51 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). If a punishment is not "unusual," he
explained, then it is not unconstitutional "even if out of accord with the theories of penology favored by the Justices
of this Court."
99. The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 103 HARV. L. REV. 137, 153 (1989).
100. Id. at 153-54.
101. Id. at 154. See also id. at 154-55 (noting that, in other death penalty rulings, the court has considered
public opinion polls in weighing consensus questions). Compare Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the
Insanity Defense: "Ordinary Common Sense" and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REV. 3, 32-35 (1990)
(discussing role of "imperfect public opinion" in death penalty and insanity defense jurisprudence).
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individuals in this area' °2 and ignores the post-Hinckley political reality °3 that the
insanity defense has been severely truncated in many jurisdictions and has been
"abolished" in others.'" Second, her discussion of disempowerment appears
somewhat disingenuous; it is a strenuous leap in logic to suggest that a decision
outlawing capital punishment of individuals with mental retardation as a violation
of the Eighth Amendment will lead to a change in civil law standards as to whether
an individual is, by way of example, competent to enter into a contract or a marriage
agreement. 05
'
On the other hand, Justice Brennan's focus on issues of moral development
engrafted an important subject of philosophical and psychological speculation into
one of the most contentious areas of the law. Although consideration of this issue
came slowly,"°6 the question as to its implications for subsequent developments still
remains open.' 7
Some seven years ago, I had this to say about the two lead cases:
To some extent, Ford and Penry serve as paradigms for the Court's confusion
about cases involving mentally disabled criminal defendants. Justice Rehnquist's
and Justice O'Connor's opinions in Ford and Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Penry remain infused with the obsessive fear that defendants will raise "false"
or "spurious claims" in desperate attempts to stave off execution. This fear-a
doppelganger of the public's "swift and vociferous.. .outrage" over what it
perceives as "abusive" insanity acquittals, thus allowing "guilty" defendants
to
10 8
"beat the rap"-remains the source of much of the friction in this area.

102. See 4 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 6 § 9C-7. For a case example, see Alvord v.
Wainwright,469 U.S. 956, 957 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
103. See 4 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 6 §§ 9C- 1-9C-8; see generally PERLIN, supra note
5, at 333-48.
104. See 4 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 6 § 9C-7. In those jurisdictions where the defense
has been "abolished," a limited mens rea defense remains. See Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The
Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence,40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 640 n. 178 (1989-90).
105. On the multiple meanings of competency, and the courts' confusion in attempting to clarify them, see
Michael L. Perlin, Are Courts Competent to Decide Questions of Competency? Stripping the Facadefrom United
States v. Charters, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 957, 967-68 (1990).
106. Compare, e.g., LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1981) to CAROL
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); see Charles Thomas & Samuel Foster, A Sociological Perspective on
Public Support of Capital Punishment,45 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 641 (1975).
107. Compare Fleming v. Zant, 259 Ga. 687, 386 S.E.2d 339 (1989) (executing mentally retarded persons
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Georgia constitution; defendant must present evidence at habeas
hearing so that the court can determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact as to his retardation), to Buttrum v.
Black, 721 F. Supp. 1268, 1307 (N.D. Ga. 1989), afftd, 908 F.2d 695 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting that Penry
"forecloses" defendant's argument that death penalty was unconstitutionally applied to her because she was
"emotionally 12 or 13 at the time of the crime"). See also Richardson v. State, 89 Md. App. 259, 598 A.2d I (Spec.
App. 1991), affid, 332 Md. 94, 630 A.2d 238 (1993) (finding the issue of defendant's mental retardation as bar to
capital punishment should be determined by trier of fact at sentencing stage, not at pretrial proceeding); Ex parte
Williams, 833 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (noting the defendant was entitled to a charge that the jury could
consider and give mitigating effect to evidence of his mental retardation in the sentencing phase. A writ of habeas
corpus was granted and the sentence vacated); State v. Patillo, 262 Ga. 259, 417 S.E.2d 139 (1992) (barring
execution of mentally retarded persons under Georgia statute, the jury should not be informed of the effect of a
finding of mental retardation in a death penalty case).
108. Perlin, supra note 19, at 216.
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II. THE ATKINS DECISION
The opening paragraph of Atkins gives us important signposts as to the
development of the case. This is how Justice Stevens begins the majority opinion:
Those mentally retarded persons who meet the law's requirements for criminal
responsibility should be tried and punished when they commit crimes. Because
of their disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their
impulses, however, they do not act with the level of moral culpability that
characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct. Moreover, their
impairments can jeopardize the reliability and fairness of capital proceedings
against mentally retarded defendants. Presumably for these reasons, in the 13
years since we decided Penry, the American public, legislators, scholars, and
judges have deliberated over the question whether the death penalty should ever
be imposed on a mentally retarded criminal. The consensus reflected in those
deliberations informs our answer to the question presented by this case: whether
such executions are "cruel and unusual punishments" prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution."
Atkins had been convicted of capital murder stemming from an ATM robbery. '"0
In the penalty phase, the defense called a forensic psychologist, who testified that
Atkins was "mildly mentally retarded" (with an IQ of 59)."' The jury convicted
Atkins and sentenced him to death; after that sentence was set aside (for unrelated
reasons), the same witness testified at the rehearing." 2 At this time, the state called
its own witness (Dr. Stanton Samenow) in rebuttal."13 Dr. Samenow testified that the
defendant was not retarded, that he was "of average intelligence, at least," and that
the appropriate diagnosis was antisocial personality disorder." 4 The jury again
sentenced Atkins to death, and this sentence was affirmed by the Virginia Supreme
Court (over a dissent that characterized the state's expert's testimony "incredulous
as a matter of law" and argued that the imposition of the death sentence on one
"with the mental age of a child between the ages of 9 and 12 [was] excessive").' '
In weighing the case, the Supreme Court first looked at the meaning of
"excessive" in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, stressing:
A claim that punishment is excessive is judged not by the standards that
prevailed in 1685 when Lord Jeffreys presided over the "Bloody Assizes" or
when the Bill of Rights was adopted, but rather by those that currently prevail.
As Chief Justice Warren explained in Trop v. Dulles....
'The basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.... The
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society."' 6

109. Atkins, 536 U.S. at306.
110. Id. at 308.
Ill.

Id.

112. Id.
at 309.
113. Id.
114. Id.

115. Id. at 310 (quoting State v. Atkins, 534 S.E. 2d 312, 323-24 (2000)).
116. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311.
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In engaging in proportionality review, the Court pointed out that its inquiry
should be guided by "objective factors," and that, in assessing these factors, the
"clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the
legislation enacted by the country's legislatures."" 7 As part of this inquiry, it noted
the significant changes since it decided Penry in 1989 when only two states banned
the execution of persons with mental retardation; in the intervening thirteen years,
at least another sixteen (and the federal government) enacted similar laws," " leading
the Court to this conclusion:
It is not so much the number of these States that is significant, but the
consistency of the direction of change. Given the well-known fact that anticrime
legislation is far more popular than legislation providing protections for persons
guilty of violent crime, the large number of States prohibiting the execution of
mentally retarded persons (and the complete absence of States passing
legislation reinstating the power to conduct such executions) provides powerful
evidence that today our society views mentally retarded offenders as
categorically less culpable than the average criminal. The evidence carries even
greater force when it is noted that the legislatures that have addressed the issue
have voted overwhelmingly in favor of the prohibition .... The practice, therefore,
has become truly unusual, and it is fair to say that a national consensus has
developed against it." 9
Further, the Court perceived that this consensus "unquestionably reflects
widespread judgment about the relative culpability of mentally retarded offenders
and the relationship between mental retardation and the penological purposes served
by the death penalty."' 2 ° The Court added that "it suggests that some characteristics
of mental retardation undermine the strength of the procedural protections that our
capital jurisprudence steadfastly guards."''
Mental retardation, the Court found, involves "not only subaverage intellectual
functioning, but also significant limitations in adaptive skills such as communication, self-care, and self-direction that became manifest before age 18. ,122 It continued in the same vein:
Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference between right and
wrong and are competent to stand trial. Because of their impairments, however,
by definition they have diminished capacities to understand and process
information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from
experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others. There is no evidence that they are more likely to
engage in criminal conduct than others, but there is abundant evidence that they
often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan, and that in
group settings they are followers rather than leaders. Their deficiencies do not

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

312 (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 331).
314-15.
315-16.
317.
318.
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warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their
personal culpability.' 23
In light of these deficiencies, the Court found that its death penalty jurisprudence
provided two reasons "consistent with the legislative consensus that the mentally
retarded should be categorically excluded from execution."' 24
First, there is a serious question as to whether either justification that we have
recognized as a basis for the death penalty applies to mentally retarded
offenders. Gregg v. Georgia'25 identified "retribution and deterrence of capital
crimes by prospective offenders" as the social purposes served by the death
penalty. 126 Unless the imposition of the death penalty on a mentally retarded
person "measurably contributes to one or both of these goals, it 'is nothing more
than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,' and hence
127
an unconstitutional punishment."'
On the question of retribution, the Court reasoned that, in light of its precedents
128
in this area,
[i]f the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to justify the most
extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of the mentally
retarded offender surely does not merit that form of retribution. Thus, pursuant
to our narrowing jurisprudence, which seeks to ensure that only the most
deserving of execution are put to death, an exclusion for the mentally retarded
29
is appropriate.
On the question of deterrence, the Court again looked at earlier cases for a
restatement of the proposition that "capital punishment can serve as a deterrent only
when murder is the result of premeditation and deliberation"'3 ° and added,
Exempting the mentally retarded from that punishment will not affect the "cold
calculus that precedes the decision" of other potential murderers ....
Indeed, that
sort of calculus is at the opposite end of the spectrum from behavior of mentally
retarded offenders. The theory of deterrence in capital sentencing is predicated
upon the notion that the increased severity of the punishment will inhibit
criminal actors from carrying out murderous conduct. Yet it is the same
cognitive and behavioral impairments that make these defendants less morally
culpable-for example, the diminished ability to understand and process
information, to learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, or to
control impulses-that also make it less likely that they can process the
information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a result, control
their conduct based upon that information. Nor will exempting the mentally
retarded from execution lessen the deterrent effect of the death penalty with

123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. Id.

125.
126.
127.
128.
crimes did
129.

428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
Id.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319 (quoting, in part, Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798).
See, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (vacating death sentence because petitioner's
not reflect "a consciousness materially more 'depraved' than that of any person guilty of murder").
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.

130. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 799.
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respect to offenders who are not mentally retarded. Such individuals are
unprotected by the exemption and will continue to face the threat of execution.
Thus, executing the mentally retarded will not measurably further the goal of
deterrence. 3'
The reduced capacity of mentally retarded offenders provided an additional
justification for a categorical rule making such offenders ineligible for the death
penalty. 3 The Court went on to note that there was an "enhanced" risk of
improperly-imposed death penalty in cases involving defendants with mental
retardation because of the possibility of false confessions, as well as "the lesser
ability of mentally retarded defendants to make a persuasive showing of mitigation
in the face of prosecutorial evidence of one or more aggravating factors."' 33 The
Court also stressed several additional interrelated issues: the difficulties that persons
with mental retardation may have in being able to give meaningful assistance to
their counsel, their status as "typically poor witnesses," and the ways in which their
demeanor "may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their
crimes."' 34
Here the Court acknowledged an important difficulty: "reliance on mental
retardation as a mitigating factor can be a two-edged sword that may enhance the
likelihood that the aggravating factor of future dangerousness will be found by the
jury,"'3 5 raising the specter that "mentally retarded defendants in the aggregate face
a special risk of wrongful execution." '36 Thus, the Court concluded, "Construing and
applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our 'evolving standards of decency,'
we therefore conclude that such punishment is excessive and that the Constitution
'places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the life' of a mentally
137
retarded offender."'
There were two dissents. Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting for himself and
Justices Thomas and Scalia, criticized that part of the majority's methodology that
had relied upon public opinion polls, the views of professional and religious
organizations, and the status of the death penalty in other nations as part of the basis
for its decision.'38 According to the Chief Justice, only "two sources-the work
product of legislatures and sentencing jury determinations--ought to be the sole
indicators by which courts ascertain the contemporary
American conceptions of
' 39
decency for purposes of the Eighth Amendment."'
Justice Scalia also dissented (for himself, the Chief Justice, and Justice Thomas),
noting immediately, "Seldom has an opinion of this Court rested so obviously upon
nothing but the personal views of its members."' 4 Justice Scalia's dissent flatly
rejected the notion that there was a "consensus" against the execution of persons

131. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320.

132. Id.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id. at 321.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting, in part, Ford, 477 U.S. at 405).
/d. at 316 n.21.
Id. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 338 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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with mild mental retardation (relying both on historical sources that had exempted
only persons with severe or profound mental retardation from that punishment 4 ' and
on his alternative reading of the data cited by the majority that led him to conclude
that, at best, a "fudged" forty-seven percent of death penalty jurisdictions had barred
such executions). 42
Rather than being based on a consensus, Justice Scalia continued, "what really
underlies today's decision [is] pretension to a power confined neither by the moral
sentiments originally enshrined in the Eighth Amendment (its original meaning) nor
even by the current moral sentiments of the American people."' 43 In his view, it was
nothing more than "the feelings and intuition of a majority of the Justices that
count-'the perceptions of decency, or of penology, or of mercy, entertained.. .by
a majority of the small and unrepresentative segment of our society that sits on this
Court.""' 14 Here he specifically rejected the majority's assumption 4that judges and

jurors were unable to "take proper account of mental retardation." 1 1
Justice Scalia assessed the majority's retribution and deterrence analyses and
found them both wanting. On the question of retribution, he noted rhetorically, "The
fact that juries continue to sentence mentally retarded offenders to death for extreme
crimes shows that society's moral outrage sometimes demands execution of retarded
offenders. By what principle of law, science, or logic can the Court pronounce that
this is wrong? There is none."' 146 He continued in the same vein: "As long as a
mentally retarded offender knows 'the difference between right and wrong,' only the
sentencer can assess whether his retardation reduces his culpability enough
to
47
exempt him from the death penalty for the particular murder in question."'1
On the deterrence issue, Justice Scalia concluded that "the deterrent effect of a
penalty is adequately vindicated if it successfully deters many, but not all, of the
target class,"'148 and, again, flatly rejected the majority's "flabby" argument that
persons with mental retardation faced a "special risk" for wrongful execution
(suggesting that "just plain stupid..., inarticulate.. .or even ugly people" might face
a similar risk, but that, if this were in
fact so, it was not an issue that came within the
49
ambit of the Eighth Amendment). 1
Finally, he expressed his "fear of faking":
One need only read the definitions of mental retardation adopted by the
American Association of Mental Retardation and the American Psychiatric
Association to realize that the symptoms of this condition can readily be feigned.
And... the capital defendant who feigns mental retardation risks nothing at all. 50
141. Id. at 338-39.
142. Id. at 342.
143. Id. at 348.
144. Id. at 348-49 (quoting, in part, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 873 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
145. Id. at 349.
146. Id. at 351.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 352.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 353. Justice Scalia contrasted this, curiously, with a reference to the feigning insanity defense
pleader who then "risks commitment to a mental institution until he can be cured (and then tried and executed)."
Id. How a defendant who feigns insanity can be cured is, to be honest, beyond me. See generally Perlin, supra note
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"Nothing has changed," he concluded, in the nearly 300 years since Hale wrote
his Pleas of the Crown:
[Determination of a person's incapacity] "is a matter of great difficulty, partly
from the easiness of counterfeiting this disability.. .and partly from the variety
of the degrees of this infirmity, whereof some are sufficient, and some are
insufficient to excuse persons in capital offenses.''
I. ATKINS' PRESSURE POINTS
Atkins leaves open many unanswered questions-the extent to which states will
adopt new prophylactic implementation procedures,' 52 the dangers in using a
numerical IQ score as the primary retardation determination "cut off factor,"' 153 the
difficulties in assessing mental retardation in persons who are not Englishspeaking, 154 the allocation of the burden of proof in making that assessment,'15 the
application of Atkins in cases of "borderline" mental retardation, 56 the interplay
between judge and jury in the determination of who is "mentally retarded" (no
matter how that term is ultimately defined), 157 the question of retroactivity of
application,5 8 among others-that are not otherwise addressed in this article. "' Also
consciously avoided is any discussion of the costs of implementation,' 6° which may
be significant if the reforms urged in this article are, in fact, to be implemented.' 6'
As will be discussed in the next section, I believe that it is impossible for Atkins
to have any authenticity unless we restructure the ways in which counsel represent
persons with mental retardation and we insure that such individuals have competent

75, at 1408-16.
151. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 354 (quoting I HALE, PLEAS OFTHE CROWN 32-33 (1736)).
152. The states' track record in the wake of the parallel case of Ford v. Wainwright has been spotty, to say
the least. See 4 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 6 § 12-4. le, at 543 (noting that post-Ford case law
reveals "a continued failure on the part of many courts to authentically implement the Forddecision").
153. See Douglas Mossman, Atkins v. Virginia: A PsychiatricCan of Worms, 33 N.M. L. REV. 255 (2003).
154. Compare, e.g., Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir.1984) (discussing discriminatory impact of IQ
tests in school placements).
155. See Christopher Slobogin, What Atkins Could Mean for People with Mental Illness, 33 N.M. L. REV.
293 (2003).
156. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 2002 WL 126985, at *57 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002) (listing defendant Willie
Smith's "verbal I.Q. of 75, classified as the borderline range between mild retardation and low-average intelligence"
as a "properly found" mitigating factor) (decided prior to Atkins).
157. Compare Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (enhancing jury role in determination of factors
increasing defendant's potential punishment), with Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (holding that an Arizona
statute authorizing trial judge to determine the presence or absence of the aggravating factors in a death penalty case
violates the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in capital prosecutions).
158. Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993) (explaining methodology for determining
application of retroactivity doctrine).
159. I hope to do so in another paper relatively soon.
160. See Carol Steiker & Jordan Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of
ConstitutionalRegulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARv. L. REV. 355, 426 (1995):
On the other hand, if the Court remains committed to addressing in some significant sense the
concerns that originally animated it in Furmanand Gregg, it is hard to see why the Court has not
attempted to flesh out the ideas for alternative regulatory regimes that we have sketched. It is
difficult to imagine a body of doctrine that is much worse-either in its costs of implementation
or in its negligible retums-than the one we have now.
161. See Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARv. L. REV. 374,433 (1982) ("The mere existence of rules
does not automatically result in their enforcement, and the costs of implementation can be high.").
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experts assisting them. Here, however, the discussion will be limited to the
seventeen "pressure point" issues'62 identified in Atkins on questions of
implementation-issues that must be taken seriously if we are to understand the
greater significance of the Atkins case.
1. The capacity of lawyers to "get" mental retardation;
2. The extent to which defense lawyers can "explain away" what may appear
to jurors as a lack of remorse on the part of defendants;
3. The ways that failures to develop retardation evidence are treated in
Strickland v. Washington'63 cases;
4. The underlying sanism of jurors in assessing mental retardation;
5. The ability of fact-finders to "unpack" the difference between cases
involving the types of violent crimes more likely to be committed by persons
with mental retardation (non-deliberate) and the types more likely to be
committed by some persons with severe mental illness (very deliberate and
planful, but equally immune from deterrence);
6. The extent to which jurors will use retardation evidence as an aggravator
rather than as a mitigator;
7. The capacity of jurors to empathize with persons with mental retardation;
8. The willingness of states to read Ake v. Oklahoma"6 expansively to insure
access to appropriate experts;
9. The role of experts in explaining the meanings of IQs, functional abilities,
capacity for moral development, etc., of persons with mental retardation;
10. The reluctance of criminal defendants, even those facing the death
penalty, to identify themselves as "mentally retarded;"
11. The ability of post-Atkins defendants to provide meaningful assistance to
counsel (assuming a finding of competence to stand trial);
12. The impact of the Godinez v. Moran6 5 morass;
13. The willingness of judges to enforce Atkins;
14. The extent to which Justice Scalia's fear-of-faking concerns will dominate
post-Atkins jurisprudence;
15. The ability of all participants to understand the relationship between such
cases and the insanity defense;
16. The attitude of prosecutors toward such cases; and
17. The ability of society to accept the reality of the number of death-eligible
defendants with mental retardation.
These seventeen issues can be "sorted" as to the interest group whose attitudes
and/or behaviors are most at issue (although there are certainly many overlaps):
defense counsel, jurors, experts, defendants, trial court judges, appellate court
judges, prosecutors, and, for lack of a better phrase, society as a whole. I will
address them in order.

162. On the use of this phrase in analyzing the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the First Amendment
context, see, e.g., Rodney Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions about Racist and Sexist Speech, 47
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 171, 194 (1990).
163. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
164. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
165. 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
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A. Defense Counsel
Issue 1. The capacity of lawyers to "get" mental retardation
Lawyers have traditionally done a terrible job of being able to identify mental
disability, being able to differentiate mental illness from mental retardation, and
"seeing" mental disability if the defendant does not "look crazy.' ' 166 Writing about

this issue seven years ago, I noted,
Nearly twenty years ago, when surveying the availability of counsel to mentally
disabled litigants, President Carter's Commission on Mental Health noted the
frequently substandard level of representation made available to mentally
disabled criminal defendants. Nothing that has happened in the past two decades
has been a palliative for this problem; if anything, it is confounded by the myth
that adequate counsel is available to represent both criminal defendants in
general, and mentally disabled litigants in particular. And, as the importance of
the construction of "mitigating" and "aggravating" evidence grows, so does the
need for counsel to be able to understand and utilize mental disability
evidence. 67
'
The dangers here should be self-evident. If a lawyer does not "get" the fact that
his client is mentally retarded, then the issues raised in Atkins may never be brought
to the court's attention.' 68 As will be explored below, there are countless cases of
lawyers' failures to identify a client's mental disability, often resulting in an
"effectiveness of counsel" challenge. 169 This issue is the first one that must be
confronted; if counsel fails here, it is impossible for Atkins to be given any kind of
meaningful life.
Issue 2. The extent to which defense lawyers can "explain away" what may
appear to jurors as a lack of remorse on the part of defendants
Jurors frequently look for visual cues and clues in determining whether a
defendant should be sentenced to death. In this process, they determine-based on
their own flawed, pre-reflective "ordinary common sense"' 7° -whether a defendant

166. On the public's demand that mentally disabled defendants "look crazy," see generally Perlin, supra note
104, at 724-27; Michael L. Perlin, The Sanist Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty Cases: The Puzzling Role of
"Mitigating" Mental Disability Evidence, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 239, 265 (1994) ("[T]he
public has always demanded that mentally ill defendants comport with its visual images of 'craziness'."). See also,
e.g., JOHN PARRY & ERIC DROGIN, CIVIL LAW HANDBOOK ON PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE AND
TESTIMONY § 1.01, at 1-2 (2001).
167. Perlin, supra note 19, at 207-08.
168. The vast majority of criminal defense lawyers have had no training in identifying or understanding
mental retardation. See, e.g., Ruth Luckasson, The Death Penalty and Those with Mental Retardation,in AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL USA, THE MACHINERY OF DEATH: A SHOCKING INDICTMENT OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 93 (1994); Sandra A. Garcia & Holly V. Steele, Mentally Retarded Offenders in the Criminal
Justice and Mental Retardation Services Systems in Florida:Philosophical,Placement, and Treatment Issues, 41
ARK. L. REV. 809, 820 (1988).
169. See 4 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 6 §12-3.6, at 506-10 nn.179-194 (representative
cases in the death penalty context). See also infra text accompanying notes 184-189.
170. See generally Perlin, supra note 101; PERLIN, supra note 7, at 16-20.
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looks sufficiently "remorseful." This behavior was noted accurately by Justice
Kennedy in his concurrence in Riggins v. Nevada, 7' relying on research by William
Geimer and Jonathan Amsterdam, demonstrating that an assessment of the
defendant's level of remorse may be the most determinative factor in the decision
as to who will live and who will die.'72
Nonetheless, this remains a significant obstacle for lawyers representing persons
with mental retardation, some of whom may gesture inappropriately, grimace,
giggle, or manifest other behaviors that jurors may translate into meaning "I don't
care.' 1 73 A person with mental retardation may not understand the consequences of
the proceedings; consequently, he may alienate the jury by "sleeping, smiling, or
staring at nothing while in court."' 74 This "unavoidable and inappropriate conduct"
may also convey a "false impression of a lack of remorse or compassion for the
victim.' ' 175 A juror, by way of example, may perceive a defendant's sitting slumped
down in his chair as acting "cool," and not showing "proper respect for the
proceedings."' 76 The lawyer must be able to neutralize these interpretations.
Beyond this, a defendant with mental retardation may not truly understand what
is transpiring in court. Even if he meets the minimalist competency-to-stand-trial test
set out in Dusky v. United States, 177 the defendant may not be able to adequately
participate meaningfully in his or her own defense. Also, persons with mental
retardation quite often suffer from very poor memory, an impediment that, when
coupled with the tendency to fall prey to others' suggestions, may render
communication of the facts178to the defense lawyer, especially the most mitigating
facts, "next to impossible."'
There is an ominous "flip side" to this coin, and it is one that cannot be
understood without a nuanced appreciation of the extent to which the phenomenon
that I call "sanism" dominates attitudes in such cases.1"' Jurors often expect people
with mental retardation to be extremely low functioning and may not be expecting
171. 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (discussing the right of competent criminal defendants to refuse the involuntary
administration of antipsychotic medications).
172. Id. at 144, relying on William Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death:
Operative Factors in Ten FloridaDeath Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 51-53 (1987-1988). I discuss the
significance of this finding in Perlin, supra note 19, at 220, and in Perlin, supra note 166, at 248. On the extent to
which fear of persons with mental illness is a key determining factor in jury death penalty decision making, see
Stephen Garvey, The Emotional Economy of CapitalSentencing, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 26 (2000). See also Shannon
v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 585-86 (1994).
173. See generally Denis Keyes et al., Mitigating Mental Retardation in Capital Cases: Finding the
"Invisible" Defendant, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 529 (1998).

174. See Joseph A. Nese, Jr, The Fate ofMentally Retarded Criminals:An Examination of the Proprietyof
Their Execution Underthe Eighth Amendment, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 373, 383 (2002) (citing ROSA EHRENREICH &JAMIE
FELLNER, BEYOND REASON: THE DEATH PENALTY AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION 4 (Malcolm Smart
& Cynthia Brown eds., Human Rights Watch) (2001)).
175. Id.
176. Keyes et al., supra note 173, at 536 (citing ROBERT EDGERTON, THE CLOAK OF COMPETENCE: STIGMA
IN THE LIVES OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED (1967)).

177. 362 U.S. 402,402 (1960). In Dusky, the Court asked whether the defendant "has sufficient present ability
to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and whether he has a "rational as well
as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." See Michael L. Perlin, "For the Misdemeanor Outlaw":
The Impact of the ADA on the Institutionalizationof CriminalDefendantswith Mental Disabilities,52 ALA. L. REV.
193, 200 (2000) (criticizing Dusky as "confusing and less than helpful").
178. Nese, supra note 174, at 383 (citing EHRENREICH & FELLNER, supra note 174, at 22).
179. See generally PERLIN, supra note 7.
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a quiet, mild-mannered individual. When the defendant fails to exhibit any
stereotypical behaviors (such as drooling, giggling, smiling with a vacant
appearance, rocking), jury members may think that the mental retardation defense
is untrue or unwarranted.'° Courts see facial expressions-purportedly "decodable"
by any layperson-as evidence of mental retardation.' 8 '
The burdens here on defense counsel are self-evidently immense. A leading
article summarizes: "Counsel must explain mental retardation and its diagnostic
process thoroughly and carefully so jurors will have a clear understanding of this
often misunderstood disability. The defense lawyer must educate the jury about
mental retardation, its various presentations, and the distinct difference between
mental retardation and mental illness.' 82
The majority in Atkins clearly understood this (as evidenced by its focus on the
ways that the demeanor of persons with mental retardation "may create an
unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their crimes").' 83 It is an open
question whether defense lawyers will pay heed to this warning.
Issue 3. The ways that failures to develop retardation evidence are treated in
Strickland v. Washington"U cases
The quality of counsel in providing legal representation to mentally disabled
criminal defendants is a disgrace. Judge Bazelon' s reference to many of the lawyers
in this cohort as "walking violations of the Sixth Amendment"' 185 has, if anything,
proven to be an understatement. 86 And when this shameful state of affairs is
combined with what we know about the performance of sporadically-assigned
counsel in death penalty cases, 187 then we should have a fairly decent sense of the
enormity of this problem.
The case law is startling and abounds with examples of lawyers failing miserably
in this area. 88 And often, such shoddy representation does not even result in a new

180. Keyes et al., supra note 173, at 536.
181. See Winiviere Sy, The Right of Institutionalized Disabled Patients to Engage in Consensual Sexual
Activity, 23 WHrrrITER L. REV. 545, 563-64 (2001) (discussing State v. Soura, 796 P.2d 109, 115 (Idaho 1990),
where the court noted that the victim's "facial expressions consisting of a 'sagging jaw, mouth open' and tendency
to 'stare off into space' were evidence of her mental retardation).
For an astonishing report, see Keyes et al., supra note 173, at 530 n. 17: "In one recent case, one of the
authors learned that the prosecutor's expert, a psychologist, suggested that because the defendant could wash his
own laundry, ride the bus and watch TV on his own, he did not have mental retardation."
182. Keyes et al., supra note 173, at 536 (citing EDGERTON, supra note 176).
183. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
184. 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably
effective assistance).
185. Bazelon, supra note l, at 2.
186. See, e.g., Louis Bilionis & Richard Rosen, Lawyers, Arbitrariness, and the Eighth Amendment, 75 TEx.
L. REV. 1301, 1321-22 n.65 (1997) (citing examples).
187. See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 19, at 203-05 (citing examples).
188. See, e.g., Smith v. Stewart, 189 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 1999), 121 Sup. Ct. 358 (2000) (finding that trial
counsel did not even investigate evidence of mental disabilities and mental impairment at the time of the crimes,
let alone present such evidence at trial); Rompilla v. Horn, 2000 WL 964750, * 14 (E.D. Pa. July 11, 2000) (noting
that trial counsel failed to inquire into and present evidence about defendant's mental retardation, cognitive
impairments, and organic brain damage); Valdez v. Johnson, 93 F. Supp. 2d 769,787 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (finding that
trial counsel failed to present evidence of Valdez's childhood history of borderline intelligence, impaired judgment,
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trial. ' 9 Although this is not a topic that is news to commentators, 190 the rich body
of descriptive, analytical, anecdotal, and prescriptive literature has had little impact
on the realities of practice in this area of the law.
B. Jurors
Issue 4. The sanism of jurors
In an earlier paper, I challenged the Supreme Court's assumption that jurors can
be relied upon to apply the law in this area conscientiously and fairly. In that paper,
I concluded,
A review of case law, controlled behavioral research and "real life" research not
only casts grave doubt on its validity, but tends to reveal the opposite: that jurors
generally distrust mental disability evidence, that they see it as a mitigating
factor only in a handful of circumscribed situations (most of which are far
removed from the typical scenario in a death penalty case), that lawyers
representing capital defendants are intensely skeptical of jurors' ability to
correctly construe such evidence, and that jurors actually impose certain
preconceived schemas in such cases that, paradoxically, result in outcomes
where the most mentally disabled persons (those regularly receiving doses of
powerful antipsychotic medications) are treated the most harshly, and that jurors
tend to over-impose the death penalty on severely mentally disabled defendants.

and poor social skills); Rondon v. Indiana, 711 N.E.2d 506, 522 (Ind. 1999) (noting that trial counsel failed to
present mitigating evidence of defendant's mental health). See generally Shruti S.B. Desai, Effective Capital
Representation of the Mentally Retarded Defendant, 13 CAP. DEF.J. 251, 253 n. 12 (2001) (discussing these cases).
189. See, e.g., Boyd v. Johnson, 167 F.3d 907 (5th Cir. Feb. 1999), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1055 (1999) (trial
counsel's failure to investigate and present possible evidence of the defendant's mental retardation did not amount
to ineffective assistance of counsel); Andrews v. Collins, 21 F.3d 612, 623 (5th Cir. 1994) (rejecting ineffective
assistance claim of defendant whose experts estimated his IQ to be 68, because he was claiming complete innocence
rather than using his mental deficiency as his defense), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1114 (1995); Motley v. Collins, 18
F.3d 1223, 1227-28 (5th Cir.) (counsel's failure to present evidence of defendant's organic brain disorder was not
ineffective), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 960 (5th Cir. 1993) (failure to offer mitigating evidence of diminished mental
capacity not ineffective assistance); Smith v. Black, 904 F.2d 950, 977 (5th Cir. 1990) (counsel not ineffective, even
though he did not introduce fact that defendant's IQ was 70); Kevin Cullen, The New Freedom Riders, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 25, 1995, at 16 (discussing case where Georgia appeals court held that defendant's trial counsel was
not ineffective, though his attorney did not raise the fact that his client's IQ was 63 nor cite the Georgia law that
bans the execution of persons with mental retardation). See generally Middleton v. Evatt, 855 F. Supp. 837, 842
(D.S.C. 1994) (counsel's reference to the mentally retarded defendant as "dumb" during closing argument did not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel), as discussed in Doug Gardner, Criminal Procedure, 31 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 517, 545 (2000); Jonathan Bing, Protecting the Mentally Retarded from Capital Punishment: State Efforts
Since Penry and Recommendations for the Future, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 59,84-85 nn. 157-158 (1996).
See also Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243 (11 th Cir. 2000) (affirming the denial of a convicted capital murder
defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, finding that his attorneys did not provide ineffective assistance of
counsel in failing to properly pursue mitigation based on his mental retardation); Diminished Capacity; Effective
Representation; MR; Miranda Rights, 21 MENTAL & PHYS. DISABILITY L. REP. 26 (1997) (discussing United States
ex rel. Davenport v. Peters, No. 96 C 2284 (N.D. II1.Nov. 14, 1996), finding that defense counsel did not provide
ineffective assistance to a murder defendant who claimed that his attorney did not present evidence of his mental
retardation).
190. See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 19; Bilionis & Rosen, supra note 186; Desai, supra note 188; Bing, supra
note 189; John Blume & David Bruck, Sentencing the Mentally Retarded to Death: An Eighth Amendment Analysis,
41 ARK. L. REV. 725 (1988); James Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO.
WASH. L REV. 414 (1985).
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Why is this? I argue that it results from a combination of important factors:
jurors' use of cognitive simplifying devices (heuristics) in which vivid, negative
experiences overwhelm rational data (and a death penalty case is a fertile
environment for such cognitive distortions) and which reify their sanist attitudes,
courts' pretextuality in deciding cases involving mentally disabled criminal
defendants, and courts' teleological decision-making in reviewing such cases. 1 '
Nothing that has taken place in the nine years since that paper was written has led
me to change my mind. These issues must be addressed if Atkins is to be
implemented in a meaningful and coherent manner.

Issue 5. The ability of fact-finders to "unpack" the difference between cases
involving the types of violent crimes more likely to be committed by persons
with mental retardation (non-deliberate) and the types more likely to be
committed by some persons with severe mental illness (often very deliberate
and planful, but equally immune from deterrence)
Fact-finders confuse and conflate mental retardation and mental illness.'92 This
confusion may be fatal to the chances of a reasoned judgment in a death penalty case
involving a defendant with mental retardation. First, the defendant may not appear
to be "mad to the man on the street."' 93 Second, the criminal conduct of a person
with mental retardation often "stem[s] from an impulsive reaction against the painful
awareness, hammered home by frustration, failure, and humiliation, of the cruel
trick that biology has played on him."' 94 Because persons with mental retardation
often lack the ability to control impulsive behavior, they are far less likely to have
planned out the commission of capital crimes 195 in the bizarre ways that some
persons with profound mental illness do.96 Thus, in many instances, given
limitations in intellectual reasoning, control of impulsive behavior, and moral
development, "it is not possible for a mentally retarded defendant to freely choose
to commit a crime."' 197 Again, I am not particularly optimistic about jurors' ability
to make these discriminating judgments.

191. Perlin, supra note 166, at 241-42 (footnotes omitted).
192. Research demonstrates that mental health professionals frequently commit this important error. See, e.g.,
Diane Courselle etal., Suspects, Defendants, and Offenders with Mental Retardation in Wyoming, I WYO. L. REV.
1, 5 (2001) (relying upon PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT:
CITIZENS WITH MENTAL RETARDATION AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 3-22 (1991)); Keyes et al., supra note
173, at 530. It defies credulity to suggest that lay jurors are more sophisticated in their determinations.
193. ALAN STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM INTRANSITION 219 (1976). See also Caton F.
Roberts et al., Implicit Theories of Criminal Responsibility: Decision Making and the Insanity Defense, II LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 207, 226 (1987) (the only defendant who will likely be found universally insane is the "totally mad
individual who acts impulsively in response to a glaring psychotic process that is itself tied thematically to a
criminal action").
194. James S. Liebman & Michael J. Shepard, Guiding Sentencer Discretion Beyond the "Boilerplate":
Mental Disorder as a Mitigating Factor, 66 GEO. L.J. 757, 825 (1978).
195. Edward Miller, Executing Minors and the Mentally Retarded: The Retribution and Deterrence
Rationales, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 15, 50 (1990).
196. See, e.g., Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2001).
197. Patricia Hagenah, Imposing the Death Sentence on Mentally Retarded Defendants: The Case of Penry
v. Lynaugh, 59 UMKC L. REV. 135, 151 (1990).
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Issue 6. The extent to which jurors will use retardation evidence as an
aggravator rather than as a mitigator
Although the Supreme Court has made it clear that mental illness is a mitigating
factor in death penalty jurisprudence,'9 8 in reality, such evidence is often seen as an
aggravating factor.'99 If competent counsel is present, the dilemma may
be even further confounded: if she should rely on certain kinds of
paradoxically
"empathy" 2"--evidence of abuse, stress, retardation, institutional failure, and
substance abuse-she runs the risk of putting before the jury the evidence that "has
the greatest potential for turning into evidence in aggravation... ,,201 In the hands of
sanist fact-finders, the presentation of such evidence can be deadly to the
Richard Sherwin has appropriately called this "the
defendant. 0 2 My colleague
23
disempathetic effect., 1
Thus, the decision whether to call experts to testify at the penalty phase of a
capital trial has "far-reaching consequences for defendants." 2" Nonetheless, defense
counsel may be inclined to withhold expert testimony as to defendants' mental
health from capital sentencers.' °5 The Atkins Court took this issue seriously,
cautioning that "reliance on mental retardation as a mitigating factor can be a twoedged sword that may enhance the likelihood that the aggravating factor of future
dangerousness will be found by the jury,' '°6 and warning of "the lesser ability of
mentally retarded defendants to make a persuasive showing of mitigation in the face
of prosecutorial evidence of one or more aggravating factors.""2 7 Again, I am
concerned about how this will "play out" in subsequent cases.

198. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982) (sentencing authority must consider any relevant
mitigating evidence); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 322 (1989) (mitigating evidence of a defendant's mental
retardation had relevance to his moral culpability); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S.782, 797-98 (2001) (jury must have
adequate vehicle so as to assess mitigating effect of mental retardation).
199. Perlin, supra note 19, at 233.
200. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361
(1996); Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Dead Man Talking: Competing Narratives and Effective Representation in Capital
Cases, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 421 (1999).
201. Perlin, supra note 19, at 233, quoting, in part, William S. Geimer, Law and Reality in the Capital
Penalty Trial, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 273, 286 (1990-1991).
202. Perlin, supra note 19, at 233.
203. See Richard Sherwin, Law, Violence, and Illiberal Belief, 78 GEo. L.J. 1785, 1821 n. 164 (1990).
204. Elizabeth F. Maringer, Witness for the Prosecution: Prosecutorial Discovery of Information Generated
by Non-testifying Defense PsychiatricExperts, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 653, 653 n.3 (1993).
205. Id. (One attorney, for example, "had a psychologist examine his client.. before his 1982 trial-but
wouldn't allow the doctor to testify... .Like many other defense attorneys, he assumed talk of brain disorders, mental
retardation or childhood abuse could evoke fear instead of empathy...."). See Scott W. Howe, Resolving the Conflict
in the Capital Sentencing Cases: A Desert-Oriented Theory of Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 323, 359 n. 136 (1992)
(citing Marcia Coyle et al., Trial and Error in the Nation's Death Belt: Fatal Defense, NAT'L L.J., June 11,1990,
at 30, 34); see also Ellen F. Berkman, Note, Mental Illness as an Aggravating Circumstancein CapitalSentencing,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 291, 304 (1989) (discussing defense counsels' dilemma concerning use of evidence of
defendants' mental illness).
206. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. at 323-25).
207. Id. at 320.
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Issue 7. The capacity of jurors to empathize with persons with mental
retardation
Little has been written about this important question, but it is one we must
consider seriously. The persistence of the mental retardation stereotype also
frequently precludes the development of juror empathy."' In cases in which the
crime is especially violent and inexplicable, we may "simply shut our eyes to the
reality of his madness in order to reap the rewards of our revenge. 20 9 In the context
of a capital trial, "empathy evidence," such as mental problems, substance abuse, or
family background difficulties, "can facilitate the jury's image of the defendant as
an 'irreparable monster' who was so retarded,
scarred, or disturbed by child abuse
210
that he just could not contain his rage.
As one scholar has noted in the context of the substantively unrelated question
of school financing,
Adding in the mentally retarded is a complicated matter: do we fear and detest
them and find it wasteful to educate them (as was the conventional outlook) or
do we now empathize with them and their parents and respond with a generous
willingness to try to do something helpful for them even at higher than average
cost?2t
Can Atkins have any impact on this issue? Early on in my writings about sanism,
I cited Chief Justice Warren's well-known phrase from Brown v. Board of
Education212-"their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone"2 1'-and noted, in the civil mental disability law context,
There have been no attempts, so far, to answer the question that has bedeviled
civil rights activists since the 1950s: how to capture "the hearts and minds" of
the American public so as to best insure that statutorily and judicially articulated

208. Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Beyond Penry: The Remedial Use of the Mentally Retarded Label in Death
Penalty Sentencing, 59 UMKC L. REV. 17, 48 (1990); see id. n. 166 (citing Samuel Pillsbury, Emotional Justice:
Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 655 (1989) (urging that empathy with the
offender is crucial to the fairness of the sentencing scheme and must be explicitly mandated to counter "the myth
of dispassion")).
209. Francine Banner, Rewriting History: The Use of Feminist Narratives to Deconstruct the Myth of the
Capital Defendant, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 569, 600 (2000-01) (citing Eileen McNamara, Nobody
Cared He Was Insane, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 30, 1996, at BI).
210. Banner, supra note 209, at 600. See also Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital
Cases: The Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 323, 362 (citing Deana D. Logan, Is It Mitigation or
Aggravation? Troublesome Areas of Defense Evidence in Capital Sentencing, CAL. Ar'Ys FOR CRIM. JUST. F.,
Sept./Oct. 1989, at 14 (discussing the possibility that ajury may "glean from evidence relating to defendant's mental
problems or background difficulties that the defendant is an 'irreparable monster' who must be put to death to
safeguard society")).
211. Stephen Sugarman, Two School-Finance Roles for the Federal Government: Promoting Equity and
Choice, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 79, 84 (1997).
212. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
213. Id. at 494. See Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities: Can Sanist Attitudes
Be Undone?, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 15, 22 (1993-94).
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and willingly-into the day-to-day fabric and
rights are incorporated-freely
14
psyche of society.'
215
The same question must be repeated here.
C. Experts
Issue 8. The role of experts in explaining the meanings of IQs, functional
abilities, capacity for moral development, etc., of persons with mental
retardation
There are multiple roles for experts in death penalty cases involving defendants
with mental retardation. A mental retardation expert may be utilized to explain the
relevance of mental retardation in either the guilt or penalty phases of trial, or both
(including relevant aspects of confessions, waiver of Miranda rights, culpability,
and potential future dangerousness).2 16 Often, a multi-disciplinary team of experts
is critical to the defense of capital defendants with mental retardation. One of the
leading practice articles instructs that defense counsel should "always contact a
mitigation or mental health expert to determine the existence of mental retardation
and complete a social-medical history before requesting the assistance of a
psychologist or psychiatrist."2'17 The article also cautions that "ordinary psychiatrists
and most psychologists are not trained in areas involving mental retardation and
courts frequently fail to make the distinction between these experts. ' '218
What are some of the factors that the expert must consider? "Speech, language
and memory impairments, physical and motor disabilities, IQ examinations and
other tests require a professional evaluation and assessment by various mental health
experts. 219 Such experts should also be able to convey to the jury "the effects that
mental retardation has on behavior and decision making, explain the vulnerable and
suggestible nature of a mentally retarded individual, and educate juries about the full
spectrum of mental retardation, irrespective of the defendant's appearance or
demeanor," and must be able to "state their findings in plain, comprehensible
language and common sense terms used by the average person. ' '22°
Finally, the expert must be able to rebut sanist myths (recall my earlier discussion
about the defendant who failed to exhibit any stereotypical behaviors, such as

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

See Perlin, supra note 213, at 22.
On the impact of the fear-of-faking myth on this question, see infra text accompanying notes 248-262.
Keyes et al., supra note 173, at 536.
Desai, supra note 188, at 268.
Id.
Id.
Id. quoting, in part, John H. Blume & Pamela Blume Leonard, Principles of Developing and Presenting

Mental Health Evidence in Criminal Cases, THE CHAMPION, Nov. 2000, at 70:

Thus the testimony of lay witnesses, such as defendant's family, friends, teachers or neighbors,
should always be presented to augment the testimony of experts. When testimony regarding the
defendant's mental retardation is presented from various sources, defense counsel must interlock
the testimonies and other relevant evidence to achieve a comprehensible presentation of the
mental retardation issue.
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drooling, giggling, smiling with a vacant appearance, rocking).22' In short, Atkins
will be an empty shell without the aggressive participation of such experts.
Issue 9. The willingness of states to read Ake expansively to insure access to
appropriate experts
In Ake v. Oklahoma,2 2 the Supreme Court held that an indigent defendant is
constitutionally entitled to psychiatric assistance when he makes a preliminary
'
showing that his sanity "is [likely] to be a significant factor at trial."223
Courts have
split on the requisite professional background to satisfy Ake's command, for
instance, on the question of whether a defendant is entitled to the appointment of an
expert psychologist

224

(certainly the appropriate professional in many cases

involving defendants with mental retardation). 225 A leading criminal procedure
treatise concludes that, "[g]enerally speaking, the courts have read Ake narrowly,
and have refused to require appointment of an expert unless it is absolutely essential
to the defense., 226 The problems here are heightened by some experts' lack of

expertise. Commentators have noted that even mental disability professionals often
inappropriately confuse mental retardation with mental illness, 227 an error that could
be, literally, fatal, in a post-Atkins case.
Will narrow readings of Ake (coupled in some cases with inexpert experts) rob
fact-finders of the full and rich explanation of mental retardation and its relationship
to the commission of the charged criminal act? I cannot answer that question, but
I believe this is an issue that cannot be ignored.
D. Defendants
Issue 10. The reluctance of criminal defendants, even those facing the death
penalty, to identify themselves as "mentally retarded"
One of the basic sanist myths is that defendants regularly feign mental disability,
and that they similarly succeed regularly in befuddling experts when they do that.
I have written extensively in an attempt to demonstrate that this is not so (and why
it is not so).221 What I am concerned about here is the inverse: criminal defendants
will mask their retardation from their counsel (and often from themselves).

221. See supra text accompanying note 181, discussing Keyes et al., supra note 173, at 536.
222. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
223. Id. at 83.
224. CompareJones v. State, 189 Ga. App. 232, 236-37, 375 S.E.2d 648, 652 (1988) (defendant not entitled
under Ake to appointment of a psychologist), with Funk v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 91, 91-93, 379 S.E.2d 371,
371-74 (1989) (court decision to appoint clinical psychologist satisfies Ake).
225. See, e.g., PARRY & DROGIN, supra note 166 § 1.09(e), at 35-37.
226. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG &DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 802 (6th ed. 2000). See
also David A. Harris, Ake Revisited: Expert Psychiatric Witnesses Remain Beyond Reach for the Indigent, 68 N.C.
L. REv. 763, 783 (1990) ("Lower courts often have interpreted Ake less than generously, unduly constricting the
availability of the right.").
227. Keyes et al., supra note 173, at 530.
228. See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 19, at 231.
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Dr. Dorothy Lewis documented that juveniles imprisoned on death row were
' Morequick to tell her and her associates, "I'm not crazy," or "I'm not a retard."229
over, a person with mental retardation will often attempt to conceal his condition
from lawyers, not realizing that his condition could constitute a major part of his
defense.23 ° Especially in a case in which counsel is substandard, this couldagain-be fatal to a defendant who ought otherwise come under the Atkins
umbrella.23 '
Issue 11. The ability of post-Atkins defendants to provide meaningful assistance
to counsel (assuming a finding of competence to stand trial)
Many defendants of ordinary intelligence do not contribute much help to their
attorneys in extracting pertinent mitigating information.232 This is certainly
"exacerbated in the situation of a retarded defendant, who may not even understand
what type of information her attorney needs, let alone begin to know how to provide
''23' The Atkins Court stressed the difficulties that persons with mental retardation
it.
may have in being able to give meaningful assistance to their counsel, their status
as "typically poor witnesses," and the ways that their demeanor "may create an
unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their crimes., 234 This is an extremely
important issue to which scant attention has been paid, and it is one that is
intensified by the reality that state criminal justice systems are ill equipped to235deal
with mentally ill or retarded defendants unable to aid their defense attorneys.
Surveys of case law underscore the inability of mentally disabled criminal
defendants to aid their counsel, even in cases in which no Dusky violation has been
found. 6 This issue must be reexamined carefully in the post-Atkins generation of
death penalty cases.

229. Perlin, supra note 75, at 1412, relying on findings reported in Dorothy Lewis et al., Neuropsychiatric,
Psychoeducational, and Family Characteristics of 14 Juveniles Condemned to Death in the United States, 145 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 584, 588 (1988) (stating that death row juveniles "almost uniformly tried to hide evidence of
cognitive deficits and psychotic symptoms"), and in Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Psychiatric and
PsychoeducationalCharacteristicsof 15 Death Row Inmates in the UnitedStates, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 838,841
(1986) (stating that all but one of a sample of death row inmates studied attempted to minimize rather than
exaggerate their degree of psychiatric disorders).
230. Nese, supra note 174, at 383 (citing EHRENREICH & FELLNER, supra note 174, at 4).
App. Ct. 1990) (testimony from doctor finding
231. See, e.g., People v. McCleary, 567 N.E. 2d 434, 437 (I11.
that, in his opinion, defendant was insane and that "defendant did not want to be known as a crazy person and, in
fact, was 'malingering sanity"').
232. Michael Mello, Facing DeathAlone: The Post-Conviction Attorney Crisis on Death Row, 37 AM. U. L.
REV. 513, 550 (1988).
233. Rebecca Dick-Hurwitz, Penry v. Lynaugh: The Supreme CourtDeals a FatalBlow to Mentally Retarded
CapitalDefendants, 51 U. Pir. L. REV. 699, 724 (1990).
234. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
235. James Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2108 n. 185 (2000).
236. See, e.g., Jeffrey Wertkin, Competency to Stand Trial, 90 GEO. L.J. 1514, 1515-16 n.1308 (2002),
discussing, inter alia, United States v. Santos, 131 F.3d 16, 20-21 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Morrison, 153
F.3d 34, 39-40,46-47 (2d Cir. 1998); Noland v. French, 134 F.3d 208, 211, 219 (4th Cir. 1998); Moody v. Johnson,
139 F.3d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Collins, 949 F.2d 921, 926-27 (7th Cir. 1991); Wise v.
Bowersox, 136 F.3d 1197, 1202-05 (8th Cir. 1998); United States. v. Frank, 956 F.2d 872, 874-75 (9th Cir. 1991);
Foster v. Ward, 182 F.3d 1177, 1189-91 (10th Cir. 1999).
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Issue 12. The impact of the Godinez v. Moran morass
The Supreme Court held in Godinez v. Moran237 that the standard for pleading
guilty and for waiving counsel was no higher than for standing trial, rejecting the
notion that competence to plead guilty must be measured by a higher (or even
different) standard from that used in incompetence to stand trial cases. 238 It reasoned
that a defendant who was found competent to stand trial would have to make a
variety of decisions requiring choices: whether to testify, whether to seek a jury trial,
whether to cross-examine his accusers, and, in some cases, whether to raise an
affirmative defense.239 While the decision to plead guilty is a "profound one," "it is
no more complicated than the sum total of decisions that a defendant may be called
upon to make during the course of a trial., 24 ° Finally, the Court reaffirmed that any
waiver of constitutional rights must be "knowing and voluntary., 241 It concluded on
this point:
Requiring that a criminal defendant be competent has a modest aim: It seeks to
ensure that he has the capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist
counsel. While psychiatrists and scholars may find it useful to classify the
various kinds and degrees of competence, and while States are free to adopt
competency standards that are more elaborate than the Dusky formulation, the
Due Process Clause does not impose these additional requirements.242
The Godinez holding may lead to a potentially absurd scenario where a defendant
with a history of mental illness or who is mentally retarded may be found competent
to stand trial if he is found to have some ability to assist counsel in some way, and
later may be allowed to remove counsel and represent himself.243 The trial of Colin
Ferguson "graphically symbolizes the dangerous implications of courts using
Godinez's low standard of competency."244
Atkins, of course, is silent on this issue, as counsel represented the defendant. But
it is an issue-how the Atkins standards can possibly be met in the case of a pro se
defendant with mental retardation-that must be taken seriously.
E. Trial Judges
Issue 13. The willingness of judges to enforce Atkins
I have written extensively about the corrosive impact of pretextuality in mental
disability law jurisprudence. "Pretextuality" means that courts accept (either
implicitly or explicitly) testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest

237. 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
238. Id. at 390.
239. Id. at 398.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 400 (quoting Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29 (1992)).
242. Id. at 402, citing Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
243. Jennifer W. Corinis, A Reasoned Standardfor Competency to Waive Counsel after Godinez v. Moran,
80 B.U. L. REv. 265, 280 (2000). See generally PERLIN, supra note 7, at 205-22; Perlin, Dignity, supra note 17.
244. Corinis, supra note 243, at 280; see generally Perlin, Dignity, supra note 17.
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(frequently meretricious) decision making, specifically where witnesses, especially
expert witnesses, show a "high propensity to purposely distort their testimony in
' This pretextuality
order to achieve desired ends."245
is poisonous; it infects all
participants in the judicial system, breeds cynicism and disrespect for the law,
demeans participants, and reinforces shoddy lawyering, blas6judging, and, at times,
perjurous and/or corrupt testifying.246
A careful examination of mental disability law reveals that judges are often
pretextual because of their own "instrumental, functional, normative and
philosophical" dissatisfaction with non-sanist constitutional decisions that grant a
measure of dignity to persons with mental disabilities.247 Trial judges who are
similarly dissatisfied with Atkins-and it does not require research or citations to
assert that there will be many--can easily sabotage it in hidden ways. This is an area
that demands extraordinary vigilance.
F. Appellate Courts
Issue 14. The extent to which Justice Scalia's fear-of-faking concerns will
dominate post-Atkins jurisprudence
Again, the sanist "fear of faking" myth dominates mental disability law.248 I have
discussed this extensively in the context of competency-to-stand-trial law,249 the
insanity defense, 250 and death penalty law, 25' and, in the insanity defense context, I
have written that it is the fear that continues to "dominate" that jurisprudence.252
Justice Scalia's dissent in Atkins is a pathetic recapitulation of this dreary myth and
may prove to be the most significant roadblock to the implementation of Atkins.
His fears-similar to ones that the Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor expressed
in Fordand in Penry253-reflect "society's suspicion that the defendant is faking the
illness and, together with her defense lawyers, will hoodwink an unsuspecting jury
into accepting fallacious medical testimony. "254 Despite the lack of empirical
support, judges deciding legal questions related to sanity frequently appeal to what
they perceive as the "significant dangers presented by feigned or spurious claims of

245. Perlin, supra note 177, at 227.
246. See, e.g., id. at 227; see generally PERLIN, supra note 7, at 59-77.
247. Michael L. Perlin, "There's No Success Like Failure/andFailure'sNo Success at All" Exposing the
Pretextualityof Kansas v. Hendricks, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1247, 1258 (1997), discussing, inter alia, judicial responses
to O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (right to liberty); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972)
(application of Due Process Clause to commitments following incompetency to stand trial findings); Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (application of substantive and procedural Due Process Clauses to
involuntary civil commitment process).
248. See generally Perlin, supra note 75.
249. See Michael L. Perlin, Pretextsand Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 625 (1993).
250. See Perlin, supra note 75.
251. See Perlin, supra note 19.
252. See PERLIN, supra note 5, at 247.
253. See Perlin, supra note 19, at 216.
254. E. Selene Steelman, A Question of Revenge: Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy and a Proposed
DiminishedCapacity Defense for HomicidalMothers, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 261, 305 (2002).

Spring 2003]

GIVING LIFE TO ATKINS

' Historically, society believed that insanity was too easily feigned, that
insanity."255
such simulation easily deceived psychiatrists, and that the use of the defense was "an
easy way to escape punishment. ' 25 6 The fear is one that has held some of this
century's most respected jurists in its thrall, regardless of the fact that it is not an
axiom of criminal procedure that rights be "denied to all because of the fear that a
'
few might abuse them."257
This helps to explain why there is increasing support for relaxing the legal
protections available to persons with mental illness, by making those persons
equally subject to the same draconian penalties now generally in favor. Thus, in
analyzing the decision of the legislature in Idaho to reduce the insanity defense to
solely a consideration of mens rea, Geis and Meier found that Idaho residents
concluded that mentally disabled criminal defendants should not be able to avoid
punitive consequences of criminal acts by reliance on either a "real or faked plea of
' A member of the Louisiana Supreme Court subsequently endorsed this
insanity."258
259
sentiment. Again, reconsider Justice Scalia's curious reference to the feigning
insanity defense pleader who then "risks commitment to a mental institution until
he can be cured (and then tried and executed). 260
The empirical realities are very different:

Malingering by mentally disabled criminal defendants is statistically rare.
Research reveals that defendants attempt feigning in less than eight percent of
all competency to stand trial inquiries. Yet, in deciding incompetency to stand
trial cases, courts continue to focus, in some cases almost obsessively, on
testimony that raises the specter of malingering. The fear of such deception has
"permeated the American legal system for over a century," despite the complete
lack of evidence that such feigning "has ever been a remotely significant
problem26of criminal procedure." This fear is a further manifestation of judicial
sanism. 1

255. Bryan Dupler, The Uncommon Law: Insanity, Executions, and Oklahoma CriminalProcedure,55 OKLA.
L. REv. 1, 38 n.208 (2002).
256. Perlin, supra note 75, at 1408.
257. Perlin, supra note 105, at 714 (quoting, in part, Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642, 649 n.35 (D.C. Cir.
1968)).
258. Gilbert Geis & Robert F. Meier, Abolition of the Insanity Plea in Idaho:A Case Study, 477 ANNALS 72,
73 (1985) (explaining that Idaho residents hold the view that persons should not be able to avoid punitive
consequences of criminal acts by reliance on "either a real or a faked plea of insanity").
259. See State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 781 (La. 1992) (Cole, J., dissenting) ("Society has the right to protect
itself from those who would commit murder and seek to avoid their legitimate punishment by a subsequently
contracted, or feigned, insanity.").
260. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 353.
261. Perlin, supra note 249, at 678-79 (footnotes omitted). See also Perlin, supra note 75, at 1405:
Perhaps the oldest of the insanity defense myths is that criminal defendants who plead insanity
are usually faking, a myth that has bedeviled American jurisprudence since the mid-nineteenth
century. Of the 141 individuals found NGRI [not guilty by reason of insanity] in one jurisdiction
over an eight year period, there was no dispute that 115 were schizophrenic.. .and in only three
cases was the diagnostician unwilling or unable to specify the nature of the patient's mental
illness.
Compare Robert Wettstein & Edward Mulvey, DispositionofInsanity Acquittees in Illinois, 16 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 11, 15 (1988) (one of 137 insanity acquittees seen as malingering).
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Again, this most compelling of all mental disability law myths262 can be attributed

to the ravaging existence of sanism. It is a myth that must be taken seriously in the
aftermath of Atkins.
Issue 15. The ability of all participants to understand the relationship between
such cases and the insanity defense
Sanism similarly infects competency-to-stand-trial jurisprudence in critical ways.
Courts stubbornly refuse to understand the distinction between competency to stand
trial and insanity, even though the two statuses involve different concepts, different
standards, and different points on the "time line," and courts frequently
misunderstand the relationship between incompetency and subsequent
commitment."' Justice Scalia's curious reference to feigned insanity defenses
suggests that this confusion persists. It is an issue that must be taken seriously in the
world after Atkins, especially when we consider the extent to which the act of
pleading the insanity defense may significantly increase the likelihood of a jury
returning a death penalty verdict.2"
G. Prosecutors
Issue 16. The attitude of prosecutors toward such cases
There has been little written about the ways that prosecutors construct cases
involving defendants with mental retardation. Jamie Fellner, an attorney with
Human Rights Watch, had this to say:
Even when a defense lawyer presents evidence of the client's retardation,
prosecutors are all too often more concerned with the professional or political
ramifications of obtaining a "victory"-a death sentence-than with giving
serious consideration to the ways mental retardation has affected the defendant's
comprehension and conduct. Faced with pressure from the community and the
victim's family, they do not want to "excuse" the crime or let an offender "off
too easy." During trials they vigorously challenge the existence of mental
retardation, minimize its significance, and suggest that although a capital
defendant may "technically" be considered retarded, he nonetheless has "street
smarts"-and hence should receive the highest penalty.265
Nothing in the body of Atkins touches on this issue, but, operationally, its
importance cannot be overstated. Again, those of us who watch post-Atkins
developments must scrutinize this carefully.

262. See Perlin, supra note 75, at 1380.
263. Perlin, supra note 177, at 235-36; Perlin, supra note 249, at 680.
264. See, e.g., David Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-FurmanEra: An
Empirical and Legal Overview with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELLL. REV. 1638, 1688-89, tbl.
6(1998).
265. Jamie Fellner, Beyond Reason: Executing Persons with Mental Retardation, 28 HUM. RTS. 9, 12 (2002).

Spring 2003]

GIVING LIFE TO ATKINS

H. Society
Issue 17. The ability of society to accept the reality of the number of deatheligible defendants who are mentally retarded
It has been estimated that up to thirty percent of all persons on death row are
267
mentally retarded.266 Other surveys range from four percent to twenty percent.
Jonathan Bing's research reveals that
[o]f the first 157 convicted murderers executed since capital punishment was
reinstituted in 1976, at least eleven of them (seven percent) were known to be
mentally retarded, although the incidence of mental retardation among the
population at large is estimated at only three percent .... Of the... 2,500 people on
death row [in 1995], it is estimated that twelve to twenty percent of them are
mentally retarded.... 268
These are numbers that many find jarring and all should find troubling. My point
here is that there is little that is exceptional or idiosyncratic about the facts of the
Atkins case. Any post-Atkins analyses must confront these statistics soberly and
carefully.
IV. CONCLUSION
I know that I have painted a gloomy picture. The questions then are these: Is it
too gloomy? If it is not, what is there, if anything, that we can do to ameliorate this
situation (and "we" here refers to those of us who take this issue seriously)?
I am convinced that the picture is not inappropriately gloomy. I began to
represent mentally disabled criminal defendants in 1971, and I have provided
representation to members of this universe at every stage of the litigation process.
I have taught about, written about, and spoken about this population since 1984. I
am convinced that the issues that I have raised here are not new ones and that they
continue to dominate this part of the legal landscape.
So this leads to my second question: What can be done? My prescriptions here
are modest but are necessary if we are to break the cycles that I have described in
this article, and if Atkins is to be, truly, given life.
First, it is essential that the organized criminal defense bar "step up to the plate"
and take stock of the status quo. It is never easy to do public self-evaluation, and
less so when the conclusions to be reached are inevitably so negative. But, if Atkins
is to have authentic meaning, groups such as the National Legal Aid and Defenders

266. Clive A. Stafford Smith & Remy Voisin Starns, Folly by Fiat: Pretending that Death Row Inmates Can
Represent Themselves in Post-convictionProceedings, 45 LOY. L. REV. 55, 70 n.92 (1999).
267. Timothy Hall, Legal Fictions and Moral Reasoning: CapitalPunishment and the Mentally Retarded
Defendantafter Penry v. Johnson, 35 AKRON L. REV. 327, 327 (2002); id. nn.2-3, citing, inter alia, Joan Petersilia,
Justicefor All? Offenders with Mental Retardation and the California Corrections System, Dec. 1, 1997 PRISON
J. 358380; Randall Coyne & Lyn Entzeroth, Report Regarding Implementationof the American Bar Association's
Recommendations and Resolutions Concerning the Death Penalty and Callingfor a Moratorium on Executions,
4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3, 40 (1996) (between twelve and twenty percent).
268. Jonathon L. Bing, Protectingthe Mentally Retardedfrom CapitalPunishment:State Efforts Since Penry
and Recommendationsfor the Future,22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 59, 62-63 (1996).
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Association, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and others
must confront the issues raised in this article and "take the lead" in educating their
members and in developing strategies to assure that counsel is authentically
"effective" (which does not mean that it simply passes the pallid Strickland v.
Washington standard).269
Second, the judiciary must-for the first time-take these issues seriously.
Judges, like jurors and other lay people, still continue to take ordinary-commonsense-like refuge in stereotyping persons with mental retardation, especially in the
cases of such persons charged with serious crimes. Legal resources are now
available to all judges that help dispel these myths, 270 but it is not at all clear whether
judges have availed themselves of these resources. It is time they do.
Third, it is time for prosecutors to stop posturing. It is black letter law that the
role of the prosecutor is not simply to win convictions, but to seek justice. 21 It is
time that this happens in these cases.
Fourth, we must again confront the corrosive and malignant impact of sanism and
pretextuality, 2 2 an impact that is at its most insidious in this sort of case. If we fail
'
to do that, then Atkins can be no more than a "paper victory."273
I end as I began, with Bob Dylan. Think again about the line that I used for my
title: "Life is in mirrors, death disappears." Then think about the words of Atkins and
these hidden issues that I have sought to raise here. My hope is that the heart and
soul of the Atkins decision do not disappear.

269. See Perlin, supra note 19, at 205-06.
270. JOHN PARRY & ERIC DROGIN, CRIMINAL LAW HANDBOOK ON PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY (2000).

271. E.g., People v. Kelley, 142 Cal. Rptr. 457,467 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (stating that a prosecutor is held to
a higher standard because of his or her unique role in exercising sovereign state power); State v. Ferrone, 113 A.
452, 455 (Conn. 1921) (stating that a prosecutor is a high public officer charged to seek impartial justice).
272. E.g., Perlin, Idiot Wind, supra note 17, at 236-37; Perlin, supra note 177, at 195; Michael L. Perlin, "I
Ain't Gonna Work on Maggie's Farm No More": InstitutionalSegregation, Community Treatment, the ADA, and
the Promise of Olmstead v. L.C., 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 53, 86 (2000); Michael L. Perlin, "Half-Wracked
Prejudice Leaped Forth": Sanism, Pretextuality,and Why and How Mental Disability Law Developed as It Did,
10 J. CONTEMP. LEG. Iss. 3, 5 (1999).
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